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Abstract 
Common definitions of “safety case” emphasize that evidence 
is the basis of a safety argument, yet few widely referenced 
works explicitly define “evidence”. Their examples suggest 
that similar things can be regarded as evidence. But the 
category evidence seems to contain (1) processes for finding 
things out, (2) information resulting from such processes, and 
(3) relevant documents. Moreover, any item of evidence 
could be replaced by further argument. Normative models of 
informal argumentation do not offer clear guidance on when a 
safety argument should cite evidence rather than appeal to a 
more detailed argument. Disciplines such as the law address 
the problem with a practical, domain-specific epistemology. 
In this paper, we explore these problems associated with 
evidence citations in safety arguments, identify goals for a 
theory of safety argument evidence and a practical safety 
argument epistemology, propose a model of safety evidence 
citation that advances the identified goals, and present a 
related extension to the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN). 
1 Introduction 
Common definitions of “safety case”, like definitions of other 
forms of assurance cases, emphasize that evidence is the 
foundation of the safety argument. For example, the GSN 
Community Standard says that a ‘reasoned and compelling’ 
assurance argument is ‘supported by a body of evidence’ [3]. 
While few commonly referenced works in the field explicitly 
define “evidence”, the examples they give suggest broad 
agreement that reviews, analyses, and tests are evidence. But 
there are subtle problems with these definitions and examples. 
First, the category of things identified as evidence seems as 
nebulous as the category “software component”, including (1) 
processes for finding things out, (2) information resulting 
from such processes, and (3) the identity of relevant 
documents. Second, any item of evidence could be replaced 
by further argument supported by evidence at a different 
scope, leading to a potentially infinite regress and a practical 
question of where to stop. Normative models of informal 
argumentation do not offer clear guidance on when a safety 
argument should cite evidence rather than appeal to more 
detailed argument. Disciplines such as the law address the 
problem with a practical, domain-specific epistemology. In 
this paper, we (a) explore the problems of evidence citation in 
safety arguments, (b) identify goals for a theory of safety 
argument evidence and a practical epistemology of safety, (c) 
propose a model of safety evidence citation that advances the 
identified goals, and (d) present an extension to the Goal 
Structuring Notation (GSN) to implement our model. 
2 “Evidence” in the argumentation literature 
In this section, we review how normative texts on safety cases 
treat evidence, identify problems in that treatment, survey the 
relevant philosophical literature on the subject, discuss how 
evidence is treated in other disciplines, and review the 
treatment of evidence in the recently finalised Structured 
Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM) [15]. 
2.1 A process, information, or an artefact? 
Normative texts on safety argumentation define evidence both 
explicitly and implicitly (e.g. through examples). While most 
experts agree that common safety lifecycle activities such as 
reviews, tests, and analyses provide evidence, they also define 
evidence variously as a process, information, or an artefact. 
These definitions are mutually contradictory and sometimes 
include things that are not normally thought of as evidence.  
The GSN Community Standard defines one of two popular 
graphical notations for recording safety arguments [3]. It 
defines evidence as ‘information or objective artefacts being 
offered in support of one or more claims’. Assumptions are 
information and can be offered in support of a claim, but are 
not evidence. Likewise, a claim might support other claims, 
but if sub-claims were evidence, the standard’s process for 
top-down construction of goal structures would halt after 
producing one layer of argument. The standard defines GSN 
solution elements as ‘references to evidence artefacts’ [3]. 
Some of the standard’s example solutions, such as ‘inspection 
report’, clearly refer to artefacts. Others, such as ‘fault tree 
analysis’, might instead refer to a process or information. 
Prior to publication of the standard, Kelly’s DPhil thesis was 
the most normative guide to GSN [14]. It does not explicitly 
define evidence, but it does give many examples of evidence 
and solutions. Some of these implicitly define evidence as the 
information produced using a known technique, while others 
seem to cite processes as evidence. For example, one diagram 
lists as examples of evidence ‘test results, fault trees, and 
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design information’. Another example cites a ‘high quality 
V&V process’ as evidence. 
Claims, Arguments and Evidence (CAE) is another popular 
graphical notation [1, 2]. Adelard’s web site defines the CAE 
evidence element as ‘a reference to the evidence being 
presented in support of the claim or argument, e.g. “the 
hardware reliability analysis report” [or] “interlock design 
documentation”’ [2]. Guidance from Adelard also notes that 
‘evidence used at one level of the argument can be: facts, e.g. 
based on established scientific principles and prior research; 
assumptions, which are necessary to make the argument, but 
may not always apply in the “real world”; or sub-claims, 
derived from a lower-level sub-argument’ [1]. 
2.2 Does evidence end the argument? 
In addition to being mutually contradictory and including 
things such as assumptions, the definitions of evidence cited 
above share another problem: they do not answer the question 
of how detailed an argument should be. An argument writer 
who cannot reliably identify evidence might not know where 
to begin a ground-up argument or stop a top-down one. One 
could presumably replace any evidence-supported claim with 
further argument. For example, rather than supporting a claim 
that a task has a given worst-case execution time by citing 
hybrid timing analysis, one could support this claim with an 
argument over the analysis tool and its inputs [6]. A claim 
about software behaviour might be supported either directly 
by test evidence or indirectly by an argument that in turn cites 
the test results and an analysis of the test plan. The possibility 
of regress raises the question of where to stop. 
Some researchers have noted that details about how reviews, 
tests, and analyses were carried out is useful in determining 
how far to trust conclusions drawn from them [11]. But 
details can obscure the big picture of what it means for a 
system to be acceptably safe and how it achieves that [9]. As 
a result, some researchers have proposed presenting some 
details in a separate confidence argument [11]. But limiting 
one part of the argument to claims about the system or service 
in question is not a complete solution; the question of how 
detailed the confidence argument should be remains. 
A developer might ask how much detail an argument should 
have. One obvious answer is ‘as much as your regulator 
wants to see’. But this answer simply shifts the burden onto 
the regulator, who might well ask a similar question. The 
question of what evidence is appears to be crucial, but current 
answers are insufficient in critical respects. 
2.3 Evidence in informal argumentation 
These concerns are not unique to assurance arguments. Since 
assurance arguments use informal logic, one might look to 
that discipline’s literature for answers. 
The informal logic initiative began in earnest in the 1970s 
with the observation that formal deductive logic did not 
sufficiently equip students to analyse the kinds of arguments 
they often encountered in the world [13]. The work most 
often cited as the underpinning of assurance argumentation is 
Toulmin’s 1958 The Uses of Argument [17]. Unfortunately, it 
does not define evidence. While Toulmin uses the word 
several times, he does so in a way that makes evidence 
indistinguishable from the more general concept of grounds. 
Many texts about informal logic have been written since (e.g., 
[18, 19]). No informal logic text we have read provides a 
suitable, explicit definition of evidence. 
This is not surprising. Informal logic, which overlaps with the 
pragma-dialectical approach born from linguistics [4], often 
takes the view that each argument is a dialogue between two 
parties attempting to determine the truth of a proposition. 
Because each participant can challenge the other to support a 
claim, there is no need to distinguish between evidence and 
further argument. Successful dialogical arguments ultimately 
rest on propositions that both participants accept as true. 
2.4 Evidence in the discipline of law 
Safety engineering is not the only discipline that relies on 
practical arguments. The discipline of law – which inspired 
Toulmin – is an obvious example, but there are others. For 
example, the evidence-based medicine initiative seeks to put 
medical diagnostic and treatment decisions on firmer footing. 
No discipline we are aware of offers an epistemology that 
could mutatis mutandis solve the problems that concern us 
here. But, as we will show, other disciplines have found 
practical substitutes for a sound universal epistemology. This 
raises hope that the safety discipline might do likewise. 
Philosophers have long noted that different disciplines accept 
different kinds of grounds as sufficient bases for the claims 
that their practitioners make. For example, Toulmin writes, 
It may turn out … not only that the sorts of grounds to 
which we point in support of conclusions in different 
fields are different, but also that the ways in which these 
grounds bear on the conclusions – the ways in which they 
are capable of supporting conclusions – may also vary as 
between fields. There are indications that this may 
actually be so: e.g. the fact that, though in many cases we 
speak quite happily of our grounds for putting forward 
some conclusion as “evidence”, in other cases this term 
would be quite out of place – a man who pointed out the 
features of a painting which, in his view, made it a 
masterpiece would scarcely be spoken of as presenting 
“evidence” that it was a great work of art. [17] 
The US and UK legal systems define their own standards of 
evidence in the form of defined standards of proof (e.g. 
preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing evidence, 
and beyond reasonable doubt) and rules of evidence (e.g. the 
US Federal Rules of Evidence). These are not instances of a 
perfect, universal theory of knowledge, but instead the result 
of experts defining and refining a practice with the aim of 
obtaining the best practical result [20]. In that sense, they 
embody a practical epistemology, a theory of the knowledge 
relevant to a discipline that can be used to make judgments on 
relevant questions under prevailing conditions. A practical 
epistemology is not static. For example, there are proposals to 
revise the US Federal Rules of Evidence to solve perceived 
problems [20]. But a practical epistemology, appropriate to 
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the legal domain, facilitates reasoning with some rigor even in 
the absence of a sound, practical universal epistemology. 
2.5 The Structured Assurance Case Metamodel 
In 2013, the Object Management Group (OMG) published the 
Structured Assurance Case Metamodel (SACM) [15].  The 
bulk of the model, created by the key figures behind GSN and 
CAE, is intended to facilitate ‘collecting, developing, 
evaluating, communicating, and managing evidence’ [15]. By 
defining what can be documented, the SACM implies aspects 
of an epistemology. But it is not clear that this epistemology 
is a suitable practical epistemology for safety. 
The SACM purports to ‘identif[y] the main factors that 
determine the evidence collection process, … the main factors 
that determine the evaluation of evidence, [and] … the 
elements of evidence’ [15]. To this end, it allows arguers to 
record, among other things, specific items of evidence, the 
form of evidence (e.g. a document or shell case recovered 
from a crime scene), relationships between evidence (e.g. this 
is part of that or belongs to that collection), claims made 
based on evidence, evaluations of evidence (e.g. whether it 
supports or challenges a claim, how relevant it is to a claim, 
the confidence it inspires, its accuracy, the degree of support, 
the reporting level, and the strength and significance of the 
evidence), properties of evidence (e.g. its completeness, 
consistency, reliability, originality, security classification, 
confidentiality requirements, and version), history and chain 
of custody (e.g., who did what to it, when, and how), approval 
and ownership, and the relevant standard of proof. 
Much of this seems relevant to understanding how given 
evidence supports a given claim. But it is not clear that it is 
practical to record all of this information for each evidence 
citation in a safety argument. While developers often record 
some of this information (e.g. configuration history), it has 
not been shown that recording all of the modelled data will 
increase the safety of deployed systems at a cost that is not 
grossly disproportionate. Some model elements seem to have 
been imported from other disciplines despite having no clear 
application in safety. For example, the SACM’s standards of 
proof are unknown, other, resolved counter evidence, beyond 
reasonable doubt, preponderance of evidence, and clear and 
convincing evidence and it models evidence as either primary 
or secondary [15]. While the standards of proof are relevant 
to US and UK jurisprudence and historians routinely classify 
evidence as primary or secondary, the utility of these concepts 
in safety argumentation has not been assessed. 
3 Goals for a practical epistemology of safety 
If we are to build a practice of argumentation around a 
practical epistemology of safety, we must first define what it 
means for an epistemology of safety to be practical. In this 
section, we identify some goals for further consideration. 
3.1 Trust, but verify … if you can 
An argument is an assertion by its writer: the evidence might 
provide support or it might not. To assess whether trust in a 
claim is justified, a reader must either (a) verify that the 
evidence exists and supports the claim as the arguer says it 
does or (b) accept the judgment of a capable person who has. 
A suitable practical epistemology must tell readers how to 
critically and practically examine the arguments they read. 
The capacity of readers to critically analyse a given reasoning 
step or piece of evidence varies. And it is possible to write 
arguments that cannot be checked with reasonable effort. For 
example, consider the claim that given low-level requirements 
refine specified high-level requirements. This might be 
supported by (i) appeal to a review of the requirements and 
traceability matrix, (ii) appeal to such a review with an 
independent confirmation, or (iii) direct reference to the 
requirements and traceability documentation. Reading (i) 
critically requires understanding what makes such a review 
trustworthy, reading (ii) critically requires knowing what 
makes an independent review trustworthy, and reading (iii) 
critically requires undertaking the review. An epistemology of 
safety defines what it means for readers to read arguments 
critically. No discipline of argumentation is practical unless 
the intended audience is capable of the necessary criticism.  
3.2 Brevity is the soul of wit 
Safety researchers continue to identify information that could 
be added to safety arguments (e.g. details of execution timing 
analysis [6]). This trend might be fuelled by a desire to make 
arguments as close to deductively valid as possible. But detail 
is added at a cost and that cost is not limited to the cost of 
recording it: detail presented in an ill-considered way could 
cause readers to fail to see the wood for the trees [9]. A 
practical epistemology of safety should facilitate arguing at a 
level of detail that balances costs and benefits. That is, it 
should help arguers to write arguments that can be read 
quickly yet clearly convey both how the system is meant to 
achieve safety and what is key to its doing so.  
Achieving this goal might require abstracting away detail that 
is relevant yet unlikely to be informative. For example, while 
a detailed argument over a timing analysis technique might 
help experts to assess whether its use supports a given claim, 
it might be more practical to simply cite the analysis as 
evidence. If the analysis technique can be shown to correctly 
predict the properties in question, arguing from, not over, the 
analysis might be briefer, clearer, and just as compelling. 
3.3 Sunlight is the best of disinfectants 
Regulators or independent assessors might use an assurance 
argument to identify where the developers’ understanding of 
“adequate” safety, system safety concept, safety plan, safety 
process implementation, or understanding of techniques and 
concepts could be improved. Gaps and flaws in the argument 
might hide or even reflect flaws in the approach to safety 
assurance for a system. While it is not generally possible to 
calculate the truth of a safety claim, the process of finding 
these gaps and flaws might reveal insights that could be used 
to improve system safety. An acceptable approach to safety 
argumentation must not hinder the search for such defects by 
oversimplifying arguments. 
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3.4 Putting evidence claims on solid foundations 
In Toulmin’s argument model, warrants – often specific to a 
discipline – are rules that support a given kind of claim based 
on a given kind of data [17]. It is important to know which 
warrant supports making a given claim from given evidence 
for two reasons. The first is that naming the warrant makes it 
possible to provide backing (justification) just once even if 
the warrant is used many times in many arguments. The 
second is that the results that provide backing are to most 
warrants are defeasible. If new studies show that a given kind 
of evidence does not support a given claim as previously 
thought, or does so only in limited circumstances, developers 
and regulators must identify where the warrant was used and 
reconsider the continued operation of the affected systems. 
3.5 Predictability is the key to managing development risk 
While safety arguments discuss operational risk (the risk of 
harm to humans or the environment posed or mitigated by the 
system in question), developers are also concerned with 
development risk (the risk that the project will fail). The better 
developers are at predicting the results of independent 
assessment of their arguments, the lower the risk of rejection 
and rework. A practical epistemology of safety could help to 
manage development risk by, among other things, offering 
clear guidance on how much detail an argument should have.  
3.6 Don’t paint yourself into a corner 
There have been proposals to adopt one or another specific 
theory of knowledge or confidence in safety arguments. But, 
as none is known to be perfect, this risks painting the 
community into a corner. For example, the SACM assumes 
that confidence can be rated as an integer in the range [0, 100] 
despite the lack of validation of any means of computing such 
figures and to the exclusion of alternatives [5]. 
4 A proposed safety evidence citation model 
To help achieve the goals defined in Section 3, we propose 
viewing the use of evidence in a safety argument as the 
application of an evidence scheme to artefacts to support a 
claim. Artefacts should be identified precisely, for example 
by unique identifier, version number, and (if the artefact is a 
large document) section number. But an artefact alone is not 
evidence: readers still need to know how it was produced and 
how to interpret it. Knowing which evidence scheme is being 
invoked tells them how. Each evidence scheme is a warrant 
for making a given claim based on given evidence. It: 
 Identifies how the artefacts relate to the “evidence”, e.g. 
making clear what test plan documents and test report 
documents have to do with evidence from testing 
 Defines how the evidence is produced and interpreted if 
applicable, e.g. identifying the kind of review process 
used to produce source code review evidence 
 Tells the reader how to be critical of the evidence, e.g. 
by identifying a set of critical questions [19] that help to 
identify challenges to a given instance of the scheme 
 Provides a name that links the warrant to established 
results and discussion surrounding that kind of evidence 
Figure 1 illustrates how GSN might be extended to document 
the application of evidence schemes. We use this example in 
the subsections below to illustrate how a practical theory of 
safety knowledge might address the issues raised in Section 3. 
The left side of Figure 1 illustrates an appeal to requirements-
based low-level testing that achieves Modified Condition/ 
Decision Coverage (MC/DC) as required by RTCA DO-178C 
 
Figure 1: Safety argument patterns for (1) an appeal to a specific form of low-level software testing (left) and (2) an appeal to a 
separate argument that has been reviewed (right). For a guide to GSN, please refer to the GSN Community Standard [3]. 
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for Level A systems [16]. Goal element GBehaviourClaim 
expresses a claim about a software module, for example that a 
component for processing raw airspeed sensor data sets a bad 
data flag if values exceed plausibility thresholds defined by 
aerospace engineers. Solution element STestRpt identifies a 
relevant artefact, in this case a test report. Strategy element 
StLLC_MC/DC – not normally permitted between a goal and 
a solution [3] – identifies the evidence scheme. Given the 
evidence scheme, we do not need to specify whether it is the 
test report, the results it contains, or some more general 
information about the testing that is the evidence. Knowing 
that this reasoning step is the application of the requirements-
based MC/DC scheme, readers will know both that the named 
artefact is a test report and how to evaluate it in conjunction 
with test plans and other documents that it cites. 
The right side of Figure 1 illustrates an appeal to a separate 
argument or argument module. Goal GClaim states a claim 
about a system element. Solution SArg identifies another 
argument (that presumably concerns the element in question). 
Solution SRevRpt – which might be instantiated many times 
– identifies a report documenting a review of that argument. 
Strategy StReviewedArg tells us that the writer is appealing 
to an argument that has been reviewed. While standard GSN 
does not allow solutions to collaboratively support the same 
goal [3], the evidence scheme here shows how the other 
argument and review reports support the claim. If this appeal 
to evidence occurs in an assured safety argument, ACP1 and 
goal GDA_ACP1 illustrate how the writer could associate a 
confidence argument with the evidence citation. 
4.1 Defining how readers should check evidence 
Knowing that SArg is being cited as a reviewed argument 
tells readers how to read it with appropriate scepticism. For 
example, we might expect the list of critical questions 
associated with this evidence scheme to include: 
 Does the cited argument make the given claim? 
 Has the argument been changed since it was reviewed? 
 Did the review aim to confirm a level of confidence at 
least as high as what is needed here? 
If the evidence scheme had been an appeal to an unreviewed 
argument, different critical questions would apply. In that 
case, critical readers might need to review the cited argument. 
If the answers to critical questions are not obvious, the writer 
might provide them in a confidence argument as illustrated in 
Figure 1. That is, the writer might use the critical questions to 
enumerate potential argument defeaters and explain why 
selected defeaters do not, in fact, defeat the argument. 
4.2 Promoting compact, focused argument 
Testing, like many things, might be done well or poorly. We 
could expand the argument to discuss how the details of a 
specific set of tests show that those tests are adequate to 
support the given claim. But that is a lot of detail, especially 
where similar testing supports many similar claims. Naming 
the evidence scheme rather than adding detail to the argument 
keeps the readers’ attention focused on the safety-relevant 
behaviour claim while linking to general knowledge about the 
sort of evidence in question, including how strong it should 
be expected to be. The limited set of readers who will be 
especially critical, such as independent safety assessors, can 
probe more deeply into the evidence citation as needed. 
Previously proposed approaches for keeping safety arguments 
brief and focused have called for details about evidence to be 
recorded in separate, linked arguments [8, 11]. But, in the 
absence of a good absolute metric for confidence in safety 
claims [5], readers must read the linked argument to know 
how far to trust a claim supported by evidence. An evidence 
scheme, in contrast, stands broadly for the evidence-related 
process and represents a named amount of confidence (even if 
that amount cannot be represented on any absolute scale). An 
arguer is free to omit details that can be inferred and so focus 
the reader’s attention only those of special relevance. 
4.3 Facilitating effective argument criticism 
Evidence schemes facilitate effective argument criticism by 
associating evidence citations with advice on how to critically 
examine the given kind of evidence. This advice might take 
the form of a list of critical questions, but could also take the 
form of a standard procedure for auditing the kind of evidence 
in question. Such advice can never be known to be complete. 
But as the community of engineers, assessors, regulators, and 
scientists discover new ways in which a given kind of safety 
evidence might fail to support a given kind of claim, the 
evidence scheme’s name provides a way of linking those 
lessons learned to the related parts of past and future safety 
arguments. 
4.4 Towards sound warrants for evidence-based claims 
Naming evidence schemes provides a means of associating 
reasoning steps with general – domain-wide if not universal – 
backing for their warrants. Because each evidence scheme is 
specific to a claim, a type of evidence, and the processes of 
producing and interpreting that evidence, it effectively defines 
research questions relating to the strength of the warrant. For 
example, the testing-related warrant illustrated in Figure 1 
frames research questions about the efficacy of requirements-
based testing that achieves MC/DC: 
 If a software module has been successfully tested in this 
way, how likely is it to meet its functional requirements? 
 Under which circumstances is this more or less likely? 
To the degree that science answers such questions, it does so 
with a variety of evidence: pilot studies (perhaps in the form 
of small case studies), studies of feasibility, experiments (with 
more or fewer participants who represent the population of 
interest to varying degrees), historical studies (of the causes 
of specific accidents or of the performance of a broad class of 
systems), and so on. No single study answers the question. 
This makes it difficult for the writer of a safety argument to 
cite a justification for using a given type of evidence. But as 
scientists continue to learn more about each type of evidence, 
regulators can take what is known into account in deciding 
the circumstances in which to accept each evidence scheme. 
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Just as the courts have built a practical epistemology in the 
form of precedent, standards of proof, and rules of evidence, 
the safety community can build a practical theory of safety 
knowledge around decisions about the circumstances under 
which the use of each evidence scheme is permissible or not. 
4.5 Making certification more predictable 
Rework (and the associated delay) is expensive. As a result, 
making certification more predictable is key to reducing 
development risk. While writers of safety arguments in some 
domains have the benefit of a standard that specifies the 
evidence their arguments should cite [12], others are faced 
with the question of where to stop. A practical epistemology 
of safety – complete with evidence schemes and rules for 
when each may be used – could provide the needed guidance. 
A writer using a top-down method proceeds until claims can 
be supported by applying a known evidence scheme that the 
relevant regulator approves of, or at least one that has gained 
community recognition and not yet been discredited. 
4.6 Keeping our options open 
The decision to document and use named evidence schemes 
would not tie the assurance argumentation community to any 
particular theory of evidence or confidence. For example, 
unlike the SACM, the idea of an evidence scheme does not 
limit users to specific standards of proof or preclude assessing 
confidence using eliminative induction [7]. Our proposal 
seems to require only the ability to name a rule of inference. 
5 Conclusion 
There is broad agreement in the safety community that safety 
arguments are based on evidence and that review, test, and 
analysis provide evidence. But there is little agreement about 
what evidence is. Information, artefacts, and the processes of 
generating and interpreting artefacts all play a role, but a 
precise definition remains elusive. What should and should 
not be cited as safety evidence is also unclear.  
Neither the philosophy literature nor other disciplines that use 
argument seem to offer a universal theory of knowledge that 
is applicable to safety arguments. But other disciplines model 
another way to make reasoned decisions: the explicit creation 
and upkeep of a practical epistemology. We hypothesize that 
recognition of a set of rules for what counts as sufficient 
evidence for a given kind of claim under given circumstances 
would provide developers, assessors, and regulators with a 
practical means to make justified decisions about how much 
detail an argument should have and whether an argument is 
sufficiently compelling. 
Because no practical epistemology is perfect, some decisions 
made by applying it will be incorrect. As our community 
develops new techniques and learns more about existing ones, 
we will need to devise, refine, replace, and repudiate evidence 
schemes. Nevertheless, using warrants based on our current 
knowledge might be the best way to keep safety arguments on 
as sound an epistemic footing as practical. 
References 
[1] Adelard. ASCAD: Adelard safety case development 
manual. Electronic document, London, UK, 1988. 
[2] Adelard. “Adelard - ASCE”. Web page: http://www. 
adelard.com/asce/choosing-asce/cae.html. Last accessed 
2 June 2015. 
[3]  K. Atwood et al. GSN community standard. Version 1, 
Origin Consulting Ltd., UK, Nov. 2011. 
[4] F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst. A systematic theory 
of argumentation: The pragma-dialectical approach. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2004. 
[5] P. J. Graydon. “Uncertainty and confidence in safety 
logic,” in Proc. Int’l System Safety Conf. (ISSC), 2013. 
[6] P. J. Graydon, I. Bate. “Realistic safety cases for the 
timing of systems”, The Computer Journal, 57(5), pp. 
759–774, 2014. 
[7] J. B. Goodenough, C. B. Weinstock, A. Z. Klein. 
“Eliminative induction: A basis for arguing system 
confidence”, In Proc. Int’l Conf. on Software 
Engineering (ICSE), 2013. 
[8] I. Habli, T. Kelly. “Achieving integrated process and 
product safety arguments”, In Proc. 15th Safety-Critical 
Systems Symp. (SSS), 2007. 
[9] C. Haddon-Cave. The Nimrod review: An independent 
review into the broader issues surrounding the loss of 
the RAF Nimrod MR2 aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 
2006. The Stationary Office, London, UK, 2009. 
[10] R. Hawkins, T. Kelly. A software safety argument 
pattern catalogue. Technical report YCS-2013-482, 
University of York, York, UK, 2013. 
[11] R. Hawkins, T. Kelly, J. Knight, P. Graydon. “A new 
approach to creating clear safety arguments”, In Proc. 
19th Safety-Critical Systems Symp. (SSS), 2011. 
[12] ISO 26262. Road vehicles — Functional safety. Int’l 
Organization for Standardization, 2011–2012. 
[13] R. H. Johnson. “Some reflections on the informal logic 
initiative”, Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, 
16(29), pp. 17–46, 2009. 
[14] T. P. Kelly. Arguing safety — A systematic approach to 
managing safety cases. DPhil thesis, University of York, 
York, UK, 1998. 
[15] Structured assurance case metamodel (SACM), Ver. 1.0. 
Object Management Group (OMG), 2013. 
[16] RTCA DO-178C. Software Considerations in Airborne 
Systems and Equipment Certification. RTCA, Inc., 2011. 
[17] S. E. Toulmin. The uses of argument. Cambridge 
University Press, New York, updated ed., 2003. 
[18] D. N. Walton. Methods of argumentation. Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2013. 
[19] D. Walton, C. Reed, F. Macagno. Argumentation 
schemes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008. 
[20] D. Walton, N. Zhang. “The epistemology of scientific 
evidence”, Artificial Intelligence and Law, 21(2), pp. 
173–219, 2013. 
